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Nontechnical Summary
GDP will become increasingly weightless as economies grow progressively
knowledge- and information-based. A succinct term for this is \dema-
terialization." With increasing dematerialization, traditional economic
mechanisms of gradual dynamic adjustment and spatial spillovers could
well become irrelevant, at the same time that the nation-state withers in
importance.
This view derives from two distinct arguments. First, as bandwidth
increases without bound for transporting economic value across space, the
importance of physical distance, slow adjustment, and spatial agglomer-
ation benets must correspondingly decrease. Second, when economic
value no longer needs to take any physical manifestation (whether that
value subsequently is in the form of electronic accounts on a clearing sys-
tem, of information content in electronic broadcasts, or of ideas and de-
sign encapsulated in software), nation-states will have progressively fewer
ways of controlling or even dening that which is particular to individual
nations.
This paper seeks to provide a rst step in quantifying the importance
of nation-state and spatial-spillover factors on economic well-being across
regions in Europe. For this analysis, the paper uses an empirical model
of dynamic (cross-region, income) distributions. Technically, the paper
seeks characterizations of a sequence of distributions in terms of their
ergodic and convergence behavior; the current work improves on earlier
related investigations in applying a conditioning operation to the distri-
bution dynamics|the conditioning is one that is naturally suggested by
the issues being studied here.
The paper asks how close, in their economic performance, European
regions are to being like isolated islands. As the empirical technique
makes clear, what is of concern here is not whether there is strong cor-
relation across regions, whether there are common factors underlying
regional uctuations, or whether dynamics are \similar" or \common"
across regions. Instead, this paper looks at the dynamic implications for
convergence|poorer regions catching up with richer ones|of the dema-
terialization scenario described above. Given actual historical develop-
ments, are regions across Europe clustering into centers of agglomeration?
Or, instead, are patterns of economic well-being levelling out to be equi-
table across physical geography? In carrying out this investigation, the
paper ends up providing a detailed picture of the dynamics of spatial
and national income distributions across Europe. Such empirical analy-
sis aids our understanding of the convergence and cohesion possibilities
of locally-focused and macroeconomic policies; it is thus useful regardless
of whether one thinks important the dematerialization and \knowledge-
based economy" concerns outlined above.
The empirical model of distribution dynamics used below draws on
related work elsewhere that has focused on cross-country growth and con-
vergence. This body of work eschews standard regression methods as the
latter average across observations to construct only a (conditional) av-
erage: but knowing how an average behaves reveals nothing about the
relative behavior of rich and poor parts of the cross section distribution.
For that, one needs an explicit model of distribution dynamics. The anal-
ysis in this paper uses exactly that. Additionally, in the application to
European regions here, the work needs to take into account the geograph-
ical (i.e., physical) location characteristics and nation-state identication
of dierent parts of the cross-section distribution. The paper provides
a technique for exploiting this conditioning information in a model of
explicit distribution dynamics.
This paper, then, nds that spatial-spillover factors matter more
than do national, macro ones. Both, however, have been important his-
torically. One interpretation of these ndings is that the dematerializa-
tion concerns above are empirically irrelevant. The other interpretation
is that those forces have not yet come into play and that what has been
estimated here simply calibrates the magnitudes of changes to come.
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ABSTRACT
Per capita incomes across European regions are not equal and do not
stay constant; regional income distributions uctuate over time. Such
a process could have many possible limiting outcomes: complete equal-
ity (convergence), stratication, and continually increasing inequality are
but three distinct possibilities. This paper asks if nation-state, macro
factors and physical-geography spillover eects help explain the observed
distribution dynamics across European regions. Geographical factors are
found to matter more than national ones; but both are important for
explaining inequality dynamics.
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1. Introduction
Location and physical geography are irrelevances in the economies constructed
by Gibson (1984), Stephenson (1992), and Sterling (1988). Sure, there is urban
sprawl|millions continue to live in recognizable counterparts to Greater London,
Tokyo, New York, and Mexico City|but, in those made-up, articial economies,
wealth creation occurs in disembodied, dematerialized processes. Little that is
physical is worth much. Or, more correctly, all things that are economically
valuable|database information, gene sequences, computer software, encryption
and code-cracking algorithms|retain value independent of their physical man-
ifestation. In producing and consuming GDP, nothing material needs to move
from one place to the next. GDP is weightless; communication costs are zero;
transporting economic value anywhere is instantaneous. Whatever agglomeration
externalities might exist, none could be spatially concentrated.
Of course, actual economies don't behave like that. In reality, location mat-
ters: consumption and output remain mostly of physical stu; and, (economists
think) people continue to share ideas and insights better when working close to
each other.
But, the vision described in the rst paragraph is not completely unfounded,
even in present reality. Manufacture of the world's most valuable commodity
already takes a form that is location-blind:
1
\Texas Instruments' high-speed telecommunications chip may look like
any other semiconductor: But it's the product of a world's worth of eort.
Conceived with engineers from Ericsson Telephone Co. in Sweden, it was
designed in Nice with software tools the company developed in Houston.
Today, the TCM9055 chip rolls o production lines in Japan and Dallas,
gets tested in Taiwan, and is wired into Ericsson line-cards that monitor
phone systems in Sweden, the U.S., Mexico, and Australia."
And, contrary to many economists' thinking, physical geography is irrelevant for
1
\The Global Chip Payo," Business Week, 7 August 1995.
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intellectual collaboration in many successful research enterprises:
2
\A networked corporation can do business anywhere, anytime, getting a
jump on competitors that still conduct business the old-fashioned way.
And it no longer matters where your best and brightest talent resides:
Sweden's L. M. Ericsson has 17,000 engineers in 40 research centers lo-
cated in 20 countries around the world, all linked into one network. De-
velopment teams in Australia and England work together on the same
design, then zip o the nal blueprint to a factory in China."
If anything, economists who study physical-location externalities seem to be con-
centrating on those old-fashioned businesses that, according to this quote, are
constantly being jumped. Moreover, modern managers and research scientists ex-
plicitly recognize and welcome this physical dislocation:
3
\While increasing numbers of workers will need ready access to wide-
ranging information resources, optimal information sharing needn't de-
mand one's physical presence in some corporate oce complex. Tomor-
row's interactions may depend far more on shared understanding than on
sharing the same oce corridor."
For brevity, I will refer to the above circle of ideas as relating to the knowledge-
based economy.
This emphasis on dematerialization in information and communication is not
conned to hi-tech, prot-seeking, private economic agents. The World Bank sees
the knowledge-based economy, founded on information networking, as a \dramatic
opportunity [for Sub-Saharan Africa] to leapfrog into the future, breaking out of
decades of stagnation or decline."
4
2
\The Networked Corporation," Business Week, 26 June 1995. The Ericsson
in this example is the same as that in the previous.
3
Arno Penzias, Harmony, excerpted in Fortune, 12 June 1995.
4
URL:http://www.worldbank.org/html/emc/Welcome.html \Increasing Inter-
net Connectivity in Sub-Saharan Africa" (accessed, August 1995).
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Such knowledge-based economy views can have profound implications. Under
the natural interpretation, physical location and the host sovereign country are
irrelevant for where economic activity happens.
5
Geographical regions, if they
remain meaningfully dened, would be like isolated islands: neither their being
part of a country, nor their being physically close to another region makes any
dierence for their economic performance.
Below, I use this extreme \knowledge-based economy" view as a strawman,
backdrop hypothesis for studying the distribution dynamics of regional incomes
across Europe. Holding up such an empirical study to this extreme view is unfair
to the latter: this view has implications that are subtle, and not yet completely
in place. However, performing the study thus allows us to quantify the existing
economic-geography features that, in this view, are targeted for change. Also,
taking such a perspective allows us to abstract away from specic details of models
of geography and location, and to clarify the macro issues at stake. Finally, what
empirical evidence can be adduced adds to understanding: more than informal
anecdote is needed to gauge the extreme view's relevance. The examples mentioned
above can easily be matched by others that argue the opposite.
Thus, this paper asks, How close are European regions to isolated islands?
How much does knowing the host country's economic performance help explain
the region's? How much does knowing that of surrounding regions|which, of
course, might belong to dierent host countries|help explain the region's? How
much do these help explain the dynamics of regional income distributions? The
answers to these questions, in the extreme view, are \completely" for the rst, and
\not at all" for all the remainder.
By contrast, in the empirics below, I show that a region's economic well-being
can be predicted by that in both surrounding regions and the host state. Both
factors matter for regional distribution dynamics. Thus, by either consideration,
5
Angell (1995) and Ohmae (1995) argue a more detailed case for the nation
state's eventual irrelevance, based on considerations similar to those I have just
described.
{ 4 {
European regions are not isolated islands.
More than does the host country's economic performance, that of surround-
ing regions helps us understand the inequalities across European regions. Thus,
for explaining regional distribution dynamics, physical location and geographical
spillovers matter more than do national, macro factors.
2. Empirics
European regions|as do all geographical units|spread out on a two-dimensional
map; the economic performance of each region can be represented as a height above
that map. Connecting those heights across space, the result is a mathematical sur-
face over the physical geography of Europe. Then, regional distribution dynamics
are vibrations in this surface.
In studying such dynamics, the researcher seeks to quantify spillover and
interaction across regions; he seeks to understand the dynamics of the entire cross-
section distribution. No region is representative; no region can be studied in
isolation independently of others. Thus, regression-based approaches, averaging
across either cross-section or time-series dimensions, are not useful. Such methods
construct a (conditional) representative, and cannot provide a picture of how the
entire cross-section distribution evolves.
6
While the description given in the rst paragraph of this section is conceptu-
ally clean, data limitations prevent its empirical implementation. Instead, I use
an alternative but still explicit model of distribution dynamics.
6
This point is forcefully made in Quah (1996b). Dobkins and Ioannides (1995),
Eckstein and Eaton (1994), and Larch (1994) have also recognized this, and use
methods related to those below in their empirical analyses. Spatial processes, e.g.,
Cli and Ord (1981), provide useful associated tools, although emphasis there
has primarily been on variation only across space, and not simultaneously over
time. See, however, Roehner (1993), which does consider spatial and dynamic
correlations jointly.
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Figure 1 shows, for dierent time periods, the density of the (log of) regional
per capita income distribution, relative to the European average. Panel (a) shows
the density for 1980{1982; (b), for 1983{1985; (c), for 1986{1988; and nally, (d),
for 1989 alone.
7
Two features of this sequence of distributions concern us: rst, churning or
intra-distribution dynamics, not shown in Figure 1; and second, changes in the
external shape of the distributions. Take these in reverse order. The dynamic
sequence in Figure 1 suggests a reduction, over time, in the cross-sectional spread of
relative incomes. Indeed, the standard deviation starts at 0.274 in 1980, increases
to a peak of 0.284 in 1981, and then falls monotonically to 0.251 in 1989: this is an
8% decline over 10 years. Next, a rst-order Markov chain t to this distribution
sequence, discretized into 5 equal-proportioned cells over the observed sample,
gives an ergodic limit that is unimodal about the mean.
8
In words, the regional
income distribution is converging towards a tighter, more concentrated distribution
than exists on average in the sample. Moreover, in the estimated Markov chain,
transition probabilities out of the current state average 10%: thus, there is also
substantial intra-distribution churning. Over time, poor regions are becoming
richer, and vice versa.
Under the extreme \knowledge-based economy" view of the previous section,
7
To meet space restrictions, Figures 1{3 are not in the published version of
this paper, but may be found in the Working Paper preprint. I use Eurostat's
(1992) purchasing-power standardized per capita incomes; details on this and other
data issues appear in the Appendix (similarly, in the Working Paper preprint,
but unavailable in the published version). All subsequent data are on log relative
incomes; I will drop the \log" for brevity. The densities in Figure 1 were estimated
by Gaussian kernel smoothing, using bandwidths given in Silverman (1986, 3.4.2).
8
The dening grid points selected by the data are at 73.5%, 88.0%, 100.0%,
and 115.6%. To save space, details on this procedure cannot be given here, but
the reader can see similar applications to distribution dynamics in Quah (1993a,
1993b, 1994, 1996a) and elsewhere.
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the distribution dynamics just described should be unaected by conditioning on
host nation-state or neighboring-region information. To assess this, I constructed
two more relative income series: rst, state-relative income, where I normalized
each region's per-capita income by the per-capita income in the host nation-state,
excluding the region itself; and second, neighbor-relative income, where I nor-
malized each region's per-capita income by the average per-capita income of the
surrounding, physically contiguous regions. It is convenient to think of these two
relative incomes as the parts unexplained by nation-state factors and physical-
location factors, respectively.
9
If the host nation-state or physical location ex-
plains everything, what is left over vanishes, or is small. If, on the other hand, the
extreme-view backdrop hypothesis holds, what is left over is what we begin with.
Figures 2 and 3 are counterparts to Figure 1 for state-relative and neighbor-
relative incomes, respectively|the scale for all three gures is the same to ease
comparison. The rst conclusion from studying these is that the neighbor-relative
distributions in Figure 3 are tighter and more concentrated than those of either
Europe-relative or state-relative incomes. The neighbor-relative distribution has
standard deviation 0.212 in 1980, increases to a peak of 0.227 in 1984, and then falls
monotonically to 0.181 in 1989. The decline over 10 years is 15%. Comparing 1989
standard deviations, neighbor-conditioning gives a reduction of 28% over that in
Europe-relative incomes. By contrast, the state-relative distribution has standard
deviation 0.222 in 1980, increases to a peak of 0.234 in 1981, and then falls to 0.218
9
Of the 78 regions in the sample, 13 had neighboring regions in countries other
than the region's own host itself; 6 had no neighboring regions at all. The average
number of physical-neighbor regions was 3.3; the average number of host-nation
regions was 13.5. More rened conditioning is certainly possible: one might want
to take into account (i) relative sizes measured by area, say; (ii) physical lengths of
abutting boundaries; or even (iii) the physical characteristics of the border terrain.
Also, instead of just taking relative per capita incomes, more exible measures of
unexplained components might be calculated. Such extensions, however, cannot
be treated within the restricted scope of the current paper.
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in 1989. Here, the decline over 10 years is 2%. Comparing standard deviations in
1989, state-conditioning gives a reduction of only 13% over that in Europe-relative
incomes.
But more information is available: Tables 1 and 2 show transition probabilities
across pre- and post-conditioned income distributions. If conditioning explained
nothing|our extreme strawman hypothesis|these transition probability matri-
ces should be the identity matrix: the distributions are invariant, and, in addition,
no intra-distribution movements occurs. The reality, however, is dierent. For in-
stance, in Table 1, the top left-hand entry shows that the poorest 20% of European
regions|having incomes less than 74% of the average|remained with incomes in
that range only with probability 0.49, after conditioning on their fellow regions
in the host nation-state. The corresponding entry in Table 2 shows even greater
change: there, the probability of remaining in the same income range is only 0.2,
after conditioning on physically-contiguous regions.
Every diagonal entry in Table 2 is smaller than the smallest diagonal entry in
Table 1: conditioning on physically-contiguous regions accounts for more observed
regional inequality than does conditioning on nation-state information. Diagonal
entries in Table 1 average to 0.6: conditioning on nation-state information already
accounts for a substantial amount of observed regional inequality. Those in Table
2 average to only 0.3: neighboring-region information accounts for even more.
3. Conclusion
This paper has taken as its underlying, backdrop hypothesis an extreme carica-
ture of the irrelevance of economic geography. The paper nds, according to its
dynamic-distribution measures, that physical location and geographical spillover
matter more than do macro factors. Both sets of factors account for a substan-
tial amount of the regional income distribution dynamics. There is thus strong
evidence against our strawman hypothesis. However, the empirical results here
carry interest, regardless of whether one takes seriously that hypothesis: the re-
sults highlight the importance of spatial and national spillovers in understanding
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regional income distribution dynamics.
10
As intended, the paper also carries interest more generally for dynamic geo-
graphical and spatial analyses. Methodologically, the paper provides an empirical
framework to study the predictions of models such as in Krugman and Venables
(1995). The conditioning analysis in Tables 1 and 2 diers from that in Quah
(1996b); it extends easily to allow richer study of conditioning in models of distri-
bution dynamics.
10
One should be circumspect in whether to dismiss casually the strawman hy-
pothesis. The ndings here do not say that the \knowledge-based economy" factors
described above are irrelevant. One can, instead, interpret these ndings as sim-
ply quantifying the changes that could occur when the dematerialized, knowledge-
based economy comes online. Explicit economic models remain to be worked out,
supporting empirical investigations remain to be done, but this author's instincts
are that some version of the knowledge-based economy scenario described in the
Introduction is not far in the future. Informal but detailed arguments are laid out
in Angell (1995) and Ohmae (1995); Quah (1995) contains a tentative theoretical
analysis.
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Table 1: State-relative per capita incomes

Upper Endpoint:
(Number) 0:74 0:88 1:00 1:16 1
(125) 0.49 0.20 0.23 0.08
(128) 0.09 0.49 0.06 0.14 0.22
(121) 0.17 0.68 0.01 0.14
(129) 0.09 0.38 0.46 0.07
(121) 0.02 0.31 0.66
Table 2: Neighbor-relative per capita incomes

Upper Endpoint:
(Number) 0:74 0:88 1:00 1:16 1
(125) 0.20 0.26 0.31 0.16 0.06
(128) 0.09 0.38 0.20 0.21 0.13
(121) 0.40 0.38 0.19 0.03
(129) 0.18 0.40 0.29 0.13
(121) 0.18 0.37 0.45

These transition probabilities describe transitions from Europe-relative incomes
to state-relative and neighbor-relative incomes, respectively. They thus quantify
the eects of conditioning, and not transitions over time. The grid is empirically
chosen as described in footnote 8. Cells are arrayed in increasing order, with the
lower right-hand corner displaying transitions from rich to rich; cell entries that
are zero to two decimal places are omitted. The numbers in parentheses on the
left are the number of region/year pairs beginning in a particular cell.
Appendix
The data are from Eurostat (1992). As does the rest of the European Commission,
Eurostat uses the agreed-upon nomenclature of statistical territorial units referred
to as NUTS (pronounced as spelt).
These territorial units partition into successive, strict renements: thus, any
NUTS-1 territorial unit contains an integral number of NUTS-2 units each of
which, in turn, contains an integral number of NUTS-3 units, and so on. In 1992,
the European Community contained 71 NUTS-1 units, 183 NUTS-2 units, and
1044 NUTS-3 units. These included the French Overseas Departments|French
Guyana in South America, and the small islands Guadeloupe, Martinique (50+
degrees West, in the Caribbean), and Reunion (50+ degrees East, by Mauritius
and Madagascar, in the Indian Ocean); the Canary Islands in the Atlantic o
Morocco and Western Sahara; and Ceuta and Melilla (two small towns in north
Africa, on the Mediterranean coast). Readers interested in more detail will nd
immeasurably useful the maps provided by the Commission.
To get a rough idea of the degree of regional disintegration analyzed in the text,
it is useful to note some further NUTS facts. In 1992 Commission terminology,
NUTS-1 units were also called European Community Regions; NUTS-2 units, Basic
Administrative Units; and NUTS-3 units, Subdivisions of Basic Administrative
Units. (There are even data at NUTS-4 level becoming available.) Within each
member state, however, terminology diered. France, Italy, and Greece referred
to NUTS-2 units as regions. By contrast the UK called NUTS-1 units regions|
consistent with Commission usage|while Ireland called its NUTS-3 units regions.
The UK has no ocial counterpart to NUTS-2 units; its 35 Basic Adminis-
trative Units were drawn up only for Commission use as groups of counties. Then,
into the UK's 65 NUTS-3 units fell a combination of counties and local authority
regions|two concepts that UK local government administration keeps distinct.
As with the UK's NUTS-2 units, NUTS-1 regions in Greece and Italy were dened
only for Commission use.
Belgium and the Netherlands called NUTS-2 units provinces, while Italy and
Spain kept that name for their NUTS-3 units. In Eurostat accounting, Ceuta and
Melilla comprise a single Spanish NUTS-2 unit, while Spain considers neither (one
nor both) Comunidades autonomas, its terminology for all of its other NUTS-2
units.
I take the basic data to be the purchasing-power standardized per capita
incomes in regions [series ECON2PIBmeasured in PPS HAB units], from 1980 through
1989. The usable series are then:
Belgium Antwerpen, Brabant, Hainaut, Liege, Limburg (Bel-
gium), Luxembourg (Belgium), Namur, OoostVlaan-
deren, WestVlaanderen
Germany Baden-Wurttemberg, Bayern, West Berlin, Bremen,
Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen,
Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein
Spain Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria, Pais Vasco, Navarra,
Rioja, Aragon, Madrid, Castilla-Leon, Castilla-La Man-
cha, Extremadura, Catal~una, Comunidad Valenciana,
Baleares, Andalucia, Murcia, Ceuta y Melilla, Ca-
narias
Italy Piemonte, Valle D'Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Trentino-
Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia-
Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Cam-
pania, Abruzzi, Molise, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria,
Sicilia, Sardegna
Netherlands Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Utrecht, Noord-Holland,
Zuid-Holland, Zeeland, Noord-Brabant, Limburg (Nether-
lands)
United Kingdom North, Yorkshire and Humberside, East Midlands,
East Anglia, South East, South West, West Mid-
lands, North West, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ire-
land
From these, three relative income series are constructed: rst, per capita
income relative to the European average; per capita income relative to other regions
in the country; and, nally, per capita income relative to physically contiguous
regions, or physical neighbors. For brevity, the text refers to these, respectively,
as Europe-relative (or just relative), state-relative, and neighbor-relative.
Since I do not have data on all countries and regions, when I say European
average, I mean the average for the sample that is used. Similarly, when data
for physically contiguous regions are unavailable, I treat those regions as non-
existent. Thus, while islands such as Baleares, Canarias, Sicilia, and Sardegna
necessarily have no neighbors, Berlin|which is land-locked|is also treated as
physically isolated. Spanish Ceuta and Melilla, taken as one region, aren't even
contiguous with each other, much less with anyone else in Europe.
Information on nation-state membership and physical contiguity was taken o
paper maps, and coded into a lisp object. A perl program read the information
there encoded, and wrote ts
rf
code, which then produced all the calculations and
graphs in the paper.
As others, e.g., Neven and Gouyette (1994), have observed, Groningen in the
Netherlands has its per capita GDP considerably increased by North Sea oil rev-
enues. In the current study, however, the conclusions do not substantively change
with or without Groningen. All the ndings in the text thus include Groningen.

Figure 1: Cross-region Relative Income, Densities
(a) 1980{82 (b) 1983{85
(c) 1986{88 (d) 1989
Figure 2: Cross-region (Nation-State) Relative Income, Densities
(a) 1980{82 (b) 1983{85
(c) 1986{88 (d) 1989
Figure 3: Cross-region (Physical-Neighbor) Relative Income, Densities
(a) 1980{82 (b) 1983{85
(c) 1986{88 (d) 1989
